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PREFACE
The ETS Policy Information Center is pleased to publish the seventh annual William H. Angoff
Memorial Lecture, given at ETS on January 11, 2001, by Dr. Susan Embretson of the University of Kansas.
The William H. Angoff Memorial Lecture Series was established in 1994 to honor the life and work of
Bill Angoff, who died in January 1993. For more than 50 years, Bill made major contributions to educational and
psychological measurement and was deservedly recognized by the major societies in the field. In line with Bill’s
interests, this lecture series is devoted to relatively nontechnical discussions of important public interest issues
related to educational measurement.
Dr. Embretson reviews the major developments in test theory, concepts, and methods that occurred dur-
ing the 20th century—the first century of ability testing—and makes some predictions about developments that
are likely to occur in this new century of testing. She predicts that the integration of cognitive theory together
with advances in psychometrics will bring major, exciting changes in test development procedures, task design,
and the range of abilities that are assessed. The research foundations and technology that will support these
advances are being developed now and are likely to continue at an accelerating pace as we move into the second
century of ability testing.
I believe that this lecture offers readers, regardless of technical background, a comprehensive introduc-
tion to the issues that have surrounded testing in the past and those issues that will be of concern in the future.
Drew Gitomer
Senior Vice President




Dazzling changes in many areas, such as technology and communications, marked the 20th century—the first
century of ability testing. Predictions about the second century of testing seem difficult in such a context. Yet, looking
back to the turn of the last century, Kirkpatrick (1900) in his APA presidential address presented fundamental desiderata
for ability testing (normative age standards, emphasis on culture-general tasks, simultaneous measurement of many
persons, and adult ability measurement) that, in fact, guides major testing research even today. An overview of the last
century shows that most fundamental principles in psychometrics and testing were available by 1930. With a few
notable exceptions, the remainder of the last century of testing was devoted to applying or refining these principles.
I predict that the same pattern will occur in this century of testing. Further developments in model-based measure-
ment and cognitive psychology principles in testing, intermingled with technology, will guide ability testing through-
out the next century. These changes, which I will elaborate in detail, include fundamental changes in test development




M   y purpose in this report is to glance into the
second century of ability testing. Developments in test
theory, concepts, and methods that occurred at the begin-
ning of the 20th century—the first century of ability test-
ing—remain influential in current testing practices. For
example, the elaboration of true and error sources of test
score variance is axiomatic to classical test theory (e.g.,
Spearman, 1904b), which remains the basis of most abil-
ity tests. But the 20th century marked progressively more
dazzling changes in many areas, including areas that are
seemingly related to testing, such as technology and com-
munications. Looking backward, it is difficult to imagine
that scholars at the turn of the 19th century could foresee
such cultural mainstays as the automobile, jet plane, and
Internet would replace the horse-drawn carriage and
telegraph. Predictions about the second century of ability
testing seem almost foolhardy in such a context.
Yet the future of ability testing may be less elu-
sive if the past is examined intensively. That is, an
examination of developments in ability testing that
occurred during the 20th century may reveal trends that
will continue in the future. In this report, I trace the foun-
dations of ability testing from the turn of the 19th cen-
tury to the end of the 20th century and present
developments broadly, including construct development,
testing issues, task design, test design, scoring models, psy-
chometric methods, and evidence systems. Then I make
predictions and speculations for the second century of
ability testing, based on research in progress from the end
of the 20th century.
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THE FIRST CENTURY OF ABILITY
TESTING: A BRIEF REVIEW
M  y purpose in reviewing the first century of ability
testing is to find major trends and patterns that may aid
in predicting the second century of testing. This review is
not intended to be comprehensive. Interested readers
should consult Thorndike and Lohman’s review of the first
century of testing (Thorndike & Lohman, 1990) for fur-
ther information.
PRECURSORS
Although not considered as part of the origins of
ability testing, Francis Galton’s anthropometric laboratory
had a major influence on testing concepts. This labora-
tory, which was based in the South Kensington Museum
in London, was an exhibit at the 1884 International
Exposition. In the laboratory, individuals could be mea-
sured on a variety of low-level cognitive functions, includ-
ing simple reaction time and performance of sensation and
perception tasks, as well as physical traits such as hearing,
muscular strength, keenness of vision, and the like.
Although such measures today would not be part of abil-
ity testing, Galton seemingly believed in their value to mea-
sure intelligence. According to Galton (1883, p. 27), “The
only information that reaches us concerning outward
events appears to pass through the avenue of our senses;
and the more perceptive the senses are of difference, the
larger is the field upon which our judgment and intelli-
gence can act.”
More important than Galton’s tests were his con-
tributions to psychometric methods. Galton applied the
normal curve to understand individual differences in func-
tioning, and he also developed a statistic, the covariance,
to represent relationships between measures. Pearson
(1901) refined the covariance into a scale-free index of
relatedness, the correlation, which is fundamental in test
theory for establishing test reliability and validity. Perhaps
most inspiring of Galton’s contributions was the anthro-
pometric laboratory itself; that is, the laboratory demon-
strated that cognitive functioning could be measured
objectively and evaluated systematically.
On the American front, James McKeen Cattell was
an important figure in promoting the basic notion of abil-
ity testing. Cattell (1890) used the term “mental test” to
characterize a series of tests that he was using to measure
college students and others. Apparently inspired by Galton,
Cattel l  also believed that intel l igence could
be measured from sensory and perceptual tasks. Like
Galton, he collected objective and standardized measures
of large samples.
Galton and Cattell’s tests, however, are not usu-
ally regarded as the origins of contemporary intelligence
testing. Interestingly, Galton’s own statistical development,
the covariance that was standardized by Pearson (1901),
provided the necessary tool to falsify these tests as mea-
sures of intelligence.
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
A conceptualization that would foretell the future
of ability testing was presented just prior to the 20th
century. Kirkpatrick (1900) in his APA presidential
address presented fundamental desiderata for ability test-
ing. According to him, ability tests developed for children
should have the following properties: 1) normative
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standards should exist for each age group, 2) the abilities
should be tested so as to have equal opportunities to
develop in children, 3) the tests are administered to whole
classes or schools at one time, and 4) the tests or proce-
dures are also applicable to adults. Although his speech
preceded the often cited origins of modern testing (i.e.,
Binet & Simon, 1908; Yerkes, 1921), Kirkpatrick’s
conceptualization of the desiderata for ability testing char-
acterizes ability testing programs even today. That
is, normative age standards for scores, emphasis on tasks
with experiential generality, simultaneous measurement
of many children, and extension of the tests to adult
ability measurement are major aspects of contemporary
ability testing.
But Kirkpatrick’s vision was not fulfilled by the
tests of Galton or Cattell. The Pearson correlation coeffi-
cient provided just the means for Wissler (1901) to exam-
ine the viability of low-level tests of cognitive functioning
to measure intelligence. Wissler found that these tests had
very low correlations with each other and with a major
criterion of learning, school achievement. In fact, grades
in gym were better predictors of academic performance
than the tests of cognitive functioning.
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
This section presents a selective review of the
developments during the first century of testing. Several
areas of development are covered: 1) individual intelligence
tests, 2) group intelligence tests, 3) psychometric meth-
ods, and 4) concepts of intelligence and ability.
Individual intelligence tests. Alfred Binet is usually
credited as the founder of modern intelligence testing,
although the many significant precursors mentioned above
also contributed to the foundations of testing. The single
most important aspect of Binet’s contribution is the use
of higher-order cognitive tasks to measure intelligence.
Specifically, tasks involving judgment, comprehension, and
reasoning were the essence of the Binet-Simon scale
(Binet & Simon, 1908; Binet, 1911) and Binet’s global
conceptualization of intelligence (Binet & Simon, 1905).
The second most important aspect of Binet’s contribu-
tion is the use of empirical criteria to select intelligence
test items. Binet’s two criteria were 1) task performance
should increase with age and 2) task performance should
be related to school achievement.
An interesting feature of Binet’s system is that
items and examinees are placed on a common scale. That
is, both items and examinees are referenced to mental age.
Tasks were scaled for mental age from empirical data on
the performance of children at various ages. Examinees
were scaled for mental age by their relative success in solv-
ing the age-calibrated tasks. Due to the age-calibrations
of the tasks, examinees may be compared even if they do
not receive the same items.
Binet (1911) believed that a diagnosis of retarda-
tion could be made by subtracting chronological age from
mental age. Large negative values (e.g., 2 or more years)
indicated retardation. Stern (1912/1914) refined the com-
parison by developing the IQ concept as a ratio (not a
subtraction) of mental age to chronological age. The ratio
IQ concept persisted in individual intelligence measure-
ment until the mid 1960s. When the ratio IQ was replaced
with normative scores, Binet’s common scale measurement
of items and examinees was de-emphasized. The common
scale measurement of items and examinees, although con-
ceptually interesting, was not easily integrated in the main-
stream of psychometric methods, which consisted of clas-
sical test theory.
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Terman (1916) was responsible for adapting the
Binet-Simon scale for use in the United States. However,
this was not a mere translation or the alteration of a few
tasks. Terman not only added tasks; he also made some
methodological changes. He not only standardized the
directions and instructions; he also added a new crite-
rion to item selection, namely internal consistency.
Terman’s work (Terman, 1916) resulted in the Stanford-
Binet intelligence test, which remains a major individual
intelligence test today as the Stanford-Binet IV. Although
the test has changed over the decades (e.g., normative IQ
scores replaced the ratio IQ scores), the current test
remains remarkably similar to the early test.
Group intelligence tests. The Army Alpha and
Army Beta tests are often cited as representing the begin-
nings of group intelligence testing. These tests were
developed over the course of just a few months in the
United States during World War I. The main goal was to
classify or select the large number of recruits for military
service. The Army tests were developed under the direc-
tion of Yerkes (summarized in Yerkes, 1921). Table 1 lists
the item types that appeared on the Army tests. The tests
were administered in paper and pencil format, with stan-
dardization in test administration procedures, instructions,
and scoring. The verification, multiple choice, or simple
completion format for the item types on the tests made scor-
ing by a clerk feasible. Scores were interpreted by reference
to empirical standards, which were represented (unfortu-
nately) by letter grades, ranging from A to E. Data on the
relationship of test scores to officer training and a variety
of military criteria supported test validity (Yerkes, 1921).
Of course, the Army tests were not developed com-
pletely anew. As noted by R. M. Thorndike and D. F.
Lohman (1990), standardized group testing had been
underway in a variety of locations, including at Columbia
by colleagues of E. L. Thorndike. Item types that were
appropriate for group ability testing, administered in paper
and pencil form, were developed prior to World War I. They
included analogies, paragraph comprehension, sentence
completion, information, block designs, and so forth. For
example, a test developed by Scott (1913) not only included
objective item types and norms, but also included crucial
Alpha subtests Beta subtests
directions mazes
arithmetical problems cube counting
practical judgment X-O series
antonyms digit symbol
disarranged sentences number checking
number series pictorial completion
analogies geometric construction
   information
Table 1 - Subtests for the Army Alpha and Army Beta Tests
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validity data, namely high correlations of test scores with
teachers’ judgments on ability. The most directly relevant
to the Army tests, Otis (1917) developed a test with verbal
items that he contributed to the Army Alpha, while Pressey
and Pressey (1918) developed nonverbal item types that
provided a model for the Army Beta.
Aside from the item types and the test administra-
tion mode (i.e., group rather than individual testing), the
psychometric model for these tests differed from the
Binet-Simon scale (Binet & Simon, 1908) in several ways.
Table 2 contrasts Binet’s scoring with Yerkes and Anderson’s
point scale method (Yerkes & Anderson, 1915). The point
scale differs from the Binet-Simon scale in item arrange-
ment, scoring, and the basis of score interpretation. Thus,
in the point scale, item types were administered in homo-
geneous blocks, credit was given for each passed, and, sig-
nificantly, scores were interpretable by reference to group
norms rather than to age. The normative basis for score
interpretation provided a more reasonable interpretation
of adult ability test scores.
Thus, the Army tests fulfilled more completely
Kirkpatrick’s vision (Kirkpatrick, 1900) than did Binet’s
tests. That is, applicability to adults and administration to
large groups characterized the Army tests but not Binet’s.
Neither test had normative standards in the contempo-
rary sense. The Army tests classified recruits in categories
(i.e., letter grades) based on their relative scores, but these
were related to mental age on the Binet (see Thorndike &
Lohman, 1990). However, it is doubtful that the Army
tests fulfilled Kirkpatrick’s fourth desideratum, namely
that the abilities tested have equal opportunity to develop,
any better than did the Binet tests. For example, the Army
Alpha subtests of Practical Judgment and Information have
item content that is clearly dependent on specific cultural
backgrounds. Other tests on the Army Alpha and most
tests on the Army Beta probably do meet this fourth
desideratum, however.
After World War I, educational testing for intelli-
gence followed the basic model of the Army tests, using
the point scale method. Homogeneous subtests with nor-
mative scoring became routine. However, the use
of subtests resulted in interesting patterns of inter-
correlations, not necessarily supporting a single general
intelligence factor. Kelley’s book, Crossroads in the Mind
of Man, (Kelley, 1928) proposed specific abilities that cor-
responded to categories of the various item types,
including spatial relationships and numerical and
verbal facility, as well as memory and speed. This book
Binet-Simon Yerkes
Item arrangement heterogeneous homogeneous subscales
Scoring pass/fail age criterion credit for each item
Norms age level multiple populations
Table 2 - Binet-Simon Scale (1908) Versus Yerkes Point Scale (1915)
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foreshadowed the major concern for the next several
decades—the development of tests for more specific abili-
ties. The development of multiple aptitude test batteries
was especially spurred on by World War II, as recruits had
to be selected for increasingly complex specialties.
Psychometric theory. Psychometric theory developed
rapidly during the first part of the 20th century. Spearman
(1904b, 1907, 1913) published a series of papers that
developed fundamental aspects of classical test theory.
Namely, Spearman introduced the concept of reliability
and expanded its relationship to validity, true and error
variance, and test length. The 1904 paper, for example,
presents the now classic formula for correcting validity cor-
relations for attenuation due to unreliability. This devel-
opment required separating true from error variance in test
scores. Spearman also proposed a formula for the impact
of test length on reliability, which is known as the
Spearman-Brown formula (Spearman, 1910).
Using internal consistency to select test items to
improve reliability also appeared early in testing. Terman
(1916) included internal consistency for selecting items
for his revision of the Binet-Simon scale (which
became the Stanford-Binet). Although the mainstay cor-
relation for item analysis in classical test theory, the biserial
correlation, had been developed quite early (Pearson,
1909), Terman apparently did not use it. Instead, he used
groups categorized on total score as a criterion to deter-
mine if item-passing probabilities increased accordingly
(Thorndike, 2002, personal communication). Formaliza-
tion of methods to select items to improve internal consis-
tency reliability, through item to total score correlations,
was active in the 1930s (e.g., Zubin, 1934; Richardson &
Stalnaker, 1933). However, the biserial correlation was
probably applied to many group tests that followed the
Army tests in the 1920s, given the assumption of biserial
correlations in the papers of the 1930s.
Spearman, with a collaborator, Hart, pioneered the
use of the pattern of correlations between a set of mea-
sures to determine the number of abilities (Hart &
Spearman, 1912). The tetrad difference criterion could
test if a single common factor (g, or general ability, pre-
sumably) could account for individual differences on the
measures. If the tetrad differences were zero, then a single
common factor was supported, but if not, then it was
unclear how many common factors were needed.
Thurstone (1931) generalized the tetrad difference ratio-
nale to multiple factors by successive evaluations of
residuals after extracting additional factors in the centroid
method of factor analysis. Although Thurstone’s subse-
quent application of factor analysis to study multiple abili-
ties (Thurstone, 1938) conflicted with Spearman’s theory,
in fact the method can be regarded as an extension of
Spearman’s method of using correlational patterns to
understand intelligence.
Significant progress in scoring also occurred early
in the 20th century. Kelley (1914) proposed that a more
adequate scoring system for ability tests would result from
normative standard scores. He proposed that z-scores be
used to represent abilities. Otis (1917) refined these into
more generalized standard scores, so the mean and stan-
dard deviation can be set to any arbitrary values. The stan-
dard score system, of course, remains current in ability
testing today.
The scaling of item difficulties also received
systematic attention quite early. Binet (1911) pioneered
empirical methods to scale item difficulties in the mental
age scale. Elsewhere, however, simple proportion passing
(still a classical test theory mainstay) was applied to scale
item difficulties.
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The precursors of item response theory (IRT) are
also found early in the 20th century. For example, match-
ing examinees to a scaling of item difficulty was attempted
on the CAVD, which tested item-completion, arithmetic,
vocabulary, and direction-following abilities (Thorndike,
Bregman, Cobb, & Woodyard, 1926). The rationale was
that items at the examinee’s level should have a probabil-
ity of .50 of being solved. Thurstone (1925) had a more
mathematical solution to this scaling, applying the phi-
gamma hypothesis from scaling to ability measurement.
Person and items were placed on a common scale by using
the normal distribution to scale item-solving probabilities.
According to Thurstone (1925, p. 436), “Each test ques-
tion is located at a point on the scale so chosen that the
percentage of the distribution to the right of that point is
equal to the percentage of right answers to the test ques-
tion for children.” The population of examinees, of course,
could be designated by z-scores. Thurstone (1925, p. 449)
presented a graph of the resulting absolute scaling of items
on mental ability. These transformations resulted in a com-
mon scaling of persons and items that is similar to that
given by the normal ogive IRT model that was developed
decades later.
IRT is regarded as having two distinct origins,
Georg Rasch (1960) and Frederic Lord (Lord, 1953; Lord
& Novick, 1968). From the 1970s onward, the measure-
ment journals were flooded with articles generalizing early
IRT models, developing new IRT models, and developing
effective estimation procedures.
Interestingly, however, the impact of IRT on abil-
ity testing was quite limited at the end of the 20th cen-
tury. Only a few large-scale tests had applied IRT by the
late 1990s. The majority of psychological tests still were
based on classical test theory, which was developed early
in the 20th century.
Theories of intelligence. A viable theory of intelli-
gence apparently preceded the actual development of
effective measures. Spearman (1904a) proposed his two-
factor theory of intelligence quite early. Although the
Binet-Simon scale (Binet, 1911) did not follow from
Spearman’s theory, Spearman later regarded the heteroge-
neous collection of tasks in the Binet-Simon scale as highly
consistent with his theory (see Thorndike & Lohman,
1990). That is, heterogeneous measuring tasks lead to a
better reflection of g, general intelligence, because the spe-
cific factors cancel out. Spearman (1923, 1927) further
elaborated his theories of intelligence and cognition prior
to 1930.
In 1921, the proceedings of a symposium on the
nature of intelligence were published in the Journal of
Educational Psychology (“Intelligence and Its Measure-
ment,” 1921). The participants included major theorists
and test developers of the time, such as Terman and
Thorndike. The views were wide-ranging and included
underlying factors such as judgment, learning, multiple
abilities, g, and more.
After 1930, attention turned to multiple aptitudes,
seemingly inspired by Kelley’s theoretical elaboration of
them (Kelley, 1928). Thurstone (1938), Guilford (1967),
and many others developed theories and corresponding
tests for the major abilities. Multiple aptitudes could be
given a more rigorous test than what early theorists could
have done, due to the development of principal factor and
component analysis (Thurstone, 1931; Hotelling, 1933).
Spearman’s seemingly contradictory view of a single apti-
tude (Spearman, 1904a) was eventually integrated into a
hierarchical framework with the multiple aptitudes. Theo-
retical organizations, such as those proposed by Horn
(1968) or Carroll (1993), unify the theories through more
sophisticated applications of factor analysis.
13
Figure 4. TIMSS Online Challenge
The nature and number of abilities were the
major concerns of intelligence theorists until the late
1970s, when Sternberg (1977) published his componen-
tial theory of intelligence. The concern shifted to under-
standing the nature of intelligence by identifying the
underlying cognitive processing involved in solving intel-
ligence test items. Known as cognitive component research,
this line continues today and has expanded to include many
different item types that appear on tests. Carroll and Max-
well (1979) regarded cognitive component research as a
fresh wind for intelligence research. This line of research
is somewhat overshadowed by research that links intelli-
gence to brain functions, which is made possible through
imaging techniques. Although ability constructs are now
often described by reference to cognitive processing, cog-
nitive component research did not have direct impact on
intelligence tests available in the late 1990s.
Sternberg and Detterman (1986) presented a con-
temporary group of intelligence theorists with the same
questions that were given to the 1921 scholars on intelli-
gence. Although some original views on the nature of
intelligence had not persisted (e.g., instinctual basis) and
some new ones had emerged (e.g., information processing
metacomponents), Sternberg and Detterman found sub-
stantial similarity among the viewpoints across the decades.
SUMMARY
Most of the fundamental principles in the nature
of the measuring tasks, testing methods, psychometric
theory, and theories of intelligence were available by 1930.
First, the tasks required to successfully measure intelligence,
judgment, and reasoning were found in Binet and Simon’s
individual intelligence tests (Binet, 1911) and in the Army
Alpha and Army Beta, and they remain current in intelli-
gence measurement today.
Second, general testing methods, including stan-
dardization of procedures and scoring, were clearly evi-
dent in the tests developed before 1920. Terman’s stan-
dardization of the Binet-Simon scale and the Army
Alpha and Army Beta testing procedures (Yerkes, 1921)
provided the model for subsequent tests throughout the
20th century.
Third, most fundamental principles for psycho-
metric methods were available by 1930. The
conceptualization of reliability by Spearman (1904b), the
development of appropriate statistics for item and test
analysis (Pearson, 1901, 1909), a conceptual framework
for factor analysis (Hart & Spearman, 1912; Thurstone,
1931), and an IRT-like common scaling of persons and
items (Thurstone, 1925) were developed before 1930.
Fourth, the basic conceptualization of intelligence
that guided subsequent testing for decades was in place by
1921. Later views clearly included some new aspects, but
they did not differ radically from earlier views.
Oscar Buros (1977) described 1927 as the banner
year when testing reached maturity. The foundation
was laid for further developments. Indeed, these were
exciting times!
Of course, further developments in all areas
occurred in the middle and final decades of the 20th cen-
tury. However, many developments were extensions or
refinements of basic principles that were already available
by 1930. As Thorndike and Lohman (1990) conclude in
their review of the first century of ability testing, the pace
slows down. Buros (1977) had a more extreme view. He
regarded 1927 as the “banner year” when testing reached
maturity, but believed that the 50 years thereafter resulted
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in little new except for electronic test scoring and
analysis. During these years, however, even into the 1990s,
numerous publications were released that covered formal-
izing and collecting classical test theory (see Gulliksen,
1950), developing and elaborating IRT (e.g., van der Lin-
den & Hambleton, 1996), developing factor analysis fur-
ther, and doing more research on the number and nature
of abilities (see Carroll, 1993, for a summary). The con-
ceptual groundwork for these developments, however, may
be traced to research prior to 1930.
Also, during this time period, the testing industry
was very active, resulting in alternative scales for measur-
ing individual intelligence (e.g., Wechsler, 1939) and a pro-
liferation of aptitude tests. The testing industry became
large and lucrative.
An informal survey of test catalogs at the turn of
the 20th century (1999) shows that both individual intel-
ligence tests and group tests follow the models that were
established early in the century. For individual tests, simi-
lar item types are used and they are selected by the same
general empirical criteria as Terman (1916). The major
change after 1930 was the scoring system when normative
IQs replaced age ratio IQs. For group tests, Yerkes’ point
scale method is employed, and many item types are simi-
lar to those that appeared on the Army Alpha or Army
Beta. Classical test theory and normative scoring remain
the predominant psychometric method.
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THE SECOND CENTURY OF ABILITY
TESTING
an empirical tryout to establish test reliability, test valid-
ity (often correlation with the old test forms), and appro-
priate norms. Hundreds to thousands of examinees could
be required for a revision, and sometimes compensation
was required for access to the appropriate population.
Revisions typically took 18 months to 2 years to com-
plete; however, often they required effort over a period as
long as 5 years. With this kind of time and expense, it is
obvious why tests changed so little over the many decades
of the last century.
However, I predict that the second century of test-
ing will have continuous test revision. The revision will
be implicit in the testing system itself. New items will be
continuously calibrated relative to the old items and then
automatically added to the test bank after minimum stan-
dards are met. That is, automated checks on item proper-
ties and fit can assure that items have sufficient quality to
be permanently entered.
Such a system cannot be too far away. The Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) testing sys-
tem already has continuous item revision. New items are
seeded into operational tests for administration in an adap-
tive testing system based on IRT. Although the calibra-
tion and evaluation of items are not yet automated, they
could be, if the programs were linked and if target item
parameters were specified.
A second aspect of continuous test revision is
updating norms. Rather than restandardizing the test with
a new version, if data collection is centralized, incoming
new protocols could be the basis of updated norms. Of
course, statistical sampling principles and case weights
should be applied so that the norms remain representative
of the same population.
During the 1980s and particularly the 1990s, new
principles for measurement were being formulated. These
developments apparently prompted Bennett (1998) to
hypothesize that testing would reinvent itself. He foresaw
three generations of this reinvention that would differ in
test purpose, content, format, delivery location, and tech-
nology. The first generation would consist of computer-
based tests. These tests would have similar purpose and
content as current paper and pencil tests, but would also
have relatively small changes afforded by computer tech-
nology. The second generation would also consist of elec-
tronic tests, but the increasing impact of technology, cog-
nitive science, and model-based measurement would
change the content, development, and scoring of tests. The
third generation, where testing reinvents itself, would con-
sist of more radical changes. Bennett envisions testing as
merging with instruction.
Like Bennett, I envision that changes are likely to
develop from model-based measurement, cognitive analy-
sis of items and tasks, and Internet delivery of tests. I pre-
dict that the following areas will change in the next 25
years: 1) test development procedures, 2) the nature
of measuring tasks, and 3) the aspects of abilities that
are measured.
TEST DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURES
In the next 25 years, I anticipate these changes in
test development procedures: 1) continuous test revision,
2) automated validity studies, and 3) item development
by artificial intelligence.
Continuous test revision. In the first century of test-
ing, test revision was a costly and time-consuming project.
Discrete test forms were developed, and the forms needed
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The first requirement for continuous test revision
is a centralized and computerized system of test delivery.
Because large amounts of data need to be available quickly,
a centralized and computerized delivery system seems
essential. A second requirement is an invariant method of
item calibration and ability estimation. That is, item
parameter estimates must not be biased by the particular
sample on which they are based. Since new items are seeded
into the system at differing times, shifts in the examinee
population could occur. IRT-based calibrations, fortu-
nately, have the property of invariance that is required.
Ability estimates also must be invariant over the particu-
lar items that are used and independent of norms. The
possibly shifting population over continuous testing and
with possibly differing items requires a method to place
abilities on a common scale. Again, IRT-based ability esti-
mates have this required property.
Automated validity studies. Like test revision,
validity studies in the first century were costly and time-
consuming. Criterion data or reference measures had to
be collected, in addition to the test scores. Analysis was
also time-consuming, requiring the merging of files and
the application of appropriate statistics.
Two types of automated validity studies can be
envisioned, which depend roughly on the distinction
between construct representation studies and nomothetic
span studies (Embretson, 1983). In construct representa-
tion studies, item properties, such as item difficulty and
response time, are mathematically modeled from item
stimulus features that represent cognitive processes. Such
models not only elaborate the nature of the construct that
is measured by the items, but they also have yielded
adequate prediction of the psychometric properties for
many item types (see Embretson, 1999). If test adminis-
tration is centralized and computerized, feasible with
Internet delivery of tests, item responses and response times
would be continuously collected. A centralized system also
could contain item stimulus features from cognitive mod-
els that predicted item psychometric properties. The model
could be checked periodically to determine if the cogni-
tive model held for the new data. Similarly, routine checks
on item fit to a psychometric model (e.g., the IRT model)
could be made. Consistency would indicate that the con-
struct representation aspect of validity had been maintained
and thus would provide further validity data. Inconsistency,
on the other hand, could be used to troubleshoot sources
of invalidity. For example, if an item fell below a certain
criterion, it could be flagged for further checks or removal
from the item bank. Bennett and Bejar (1998) envision
that automated scoring for open-ended responses also
could profit from similar ongoing evaluations.
The other aspect of construct validity, nomoth-
etic span, concerns the relationships of test scores with
external measures. The centralized test delivery system
could also be organized to include other sources of infor-
mation on examinees, such as criterion scores or school
learning, demographic information, and other test scores.
Analyses could include differential item functioning and
the external correlates of test scores. Again, centralized
programming could be developed to routinely assess
nomothetic span with incoming data and compare it to
previous results. As for the construct representation data,
consistency provides new support for validity while incon-
sistency can be used to troubleshoot the test.
Like continuous test revision, automated test
validity studies do not seem too far away.
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Item development by artificial intelligence. If test
items can be automatically calibrated and then adaptively
selected for use, it is feasible at least to imagine a system
in which new items could be written by a computer pro-
gram. Although this seems rather futuristic, the precur-
sors of such systems, in fact, are already in progress. Bejar
(1990, 1996) describes an item generative testing system
in which items are variations of “item models.” The item
model is an existing item that has satisfactory psychomet-
ric properties. Research to pilot item generation for math-
ematical items for the Graduate Record Examinations
(GRE) is in progress. Embretson (1999) presented non-
verbal reasoning items that were generated according to a
cognitive model to target psychometric properties. These
developments will be described later in “The Nature of
the Measuring Tasks.”
Item development by artificial intelligence has
practical importance for adaptive testing. Adaptive test-
ing requires large item banks with many items at all levels
so that equally precise measurements can be obtained. Item
generation also can have theoretical importance for con-
struct validity, about which I will elaborate later.
It is only a slight leap to envision item generators
as the source of new items for seeding into a continuously
revised test. Such items could be evaluated automatically
for fit and target psychometric properties prior to perma-
nent entry into the item bank.
However, I envision an item generative testing
system that goes beyond an item source for continuous
test revision. If items can be created for seeding, they also
could be created instantaneously for the examinee during
testing. That is, new items are generated to target psycho-
metric properties during the operational test. This vision,
similar to Bejar’s (Bejar, 1996), seems on the surface to
conflict with basic measurement principles from the first
century of testing. Calibrated items are essential to
scoring. Hence, item development requires multiple stages
and tryouts.
The resolution to this seeming conflict depends
on what is calibrated. Rather than calibrate items, design
principles can be calibrated. In turn, these calibrated
design principles predict the psychometric properties of
items. The requirements for this level of item generation
are either a cognitive design system behind the items (see
Embretson, 1998, 2001) or an item model (Bejar, 1996).
In the former case, actual items are generated from deep
structures that embed the cognitive design features for
items. Several psychometric models that can include
design features have been proposed, starting with Fischer’s
linear logistic test model (LLTM) (Fischer, 1973). I
describe this later. In the latter case, new items are created
as variations of old items with substituted stimulus fea-
tures. In this case, data need to be given to support the
psychometric calibrations for the item model as appropri-
ate for the variants.
At the turn of the 21st century, several computer
programs were developed that can generate items.
ITEMGEN1 (2002) can produce six item types for non-
verbal intelligence tests, including the matrix completion
problems described below for measuring abstract intelli-
gence. Other item generators are the Test Creation Assis-
tant (Singley & Bennett, 2002) and the GRE math item
generator (Bejar et al., in press). These generators are based
on an item model, within which key features of the item
are varied. For example, for math word problems, the spe-
cific number in the problem or the specific characters or
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setting can be varied. These generators require that the
substitutions do not change the difficulty from the origi-
nal item that provided the model.
The development of item generators is time-con-
suming and somewhat expensive initially. Each item type
requires its own cognitive design system, which is based
on a separate research foundation. However, compared to
the ongoing cost of human item writers, the practical fea-
sibility probably will lead to a rapid expansion of item
generators in the near future.
It is interesting to imagine a testing system that
combines all three predicted aspects of test development
procedures, continuous test revision, automatic and con-
tinuous validity studies, and item development by artifi-
cial intelligence. Such a system could be self-sustaining
without human intelligence. I predict that such systems
will be operational in the first quarter of the second cen-
tury of testing.
THE NATURE OF THE MEASURING TASKS
I predict several changes in the nature of the mea-
suring tasks, including: 1) shorter and more reliable tests,
2) item generation by cognitive design principles, 3) greater
use of essays, completions, and worked problems, 4) broad
conceptualization of what constitutes a “test item,” and 5)
flexible mixtures of evidence for ability.
Shorter and more reliable tests. Classical test theory
wisdom is that longer tests are more reliable. The
Spearman-Brown prophecy formula predicts increased
reliability as test length increases, assuming that items of
equal qualities are added.
I predict that shorter and more reliable tests will
soon become commonplace. Shorter and more reliable tests
depend on adaptive testing, in which items are selected to
provide optimal information about the examinee. IRT is
used to equate scores over the differing sets of items. Tests
today that are adaptive include the ASVAB, Test of
English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), and the GRE.
Figure 1 points out how both measurement error
and test length can be reduced under adaptive testing. The
standard error of measurement under IRT calibrations is
shown for various ability levels for four tests from simu-
lated data. The U-shaped curves display the standard
errors under IRT calibrations for fixed length tests. In Fig-
ure 1, greater error is observed for estimating extreme abili-
ties, as typical for fixed content tests, due to the fewer
appropriate items for these examinees. Consistent with
classical test theory, though, greater error is observed for
all ability levels for the shorter (20-item) test than for the
longer (30-item) test.
The other lines shown in Figure 1 represent stan-
dard errors for two adaptive tests from a large and wide-
ranging item bank. In this case, measurement errors are
approximately equal for all ability levels. And, consistent
with classical test theory, the 30-item test has less mea-
surement error than the 20-item test at all ability levels.
The important comparison is relative standard
errors between the adaptive and the fixed content test.
Notice that for most ability levels, the 20-item adaptive
test yields less measurement error than the 30-item fixed
content test. That is, we have a shorter and more reliable
test. Obviously, the key to this effect is the selection of
the most informative items in the adaptive test.
A possible incidental effect of shorter and more
reliable tests is an impact on construct validity. Recently,
I prepared two versions of an abstract reasoning test, a




























for a study on aging. One problem with ability measure-
ment in an older population is that reduced motivation
and self-efficacy may lower performance levels. Although
18 items are not many for measuring ability, the shorter
and more appropriate test was also deemed by the investi-
gator to maintain higher motivational levels. The results
of a pilot sample on the two tests are presented on Figure
2. The 18-item adaptive test performs surprisingly well,
with less measurement error at all ability levels than the
fixed test, which had many items that were beyond
the sample.
The intriguing issue
about construct validity is this:
Will performance levels of the
elderly taking a shorter test
increase relative to younger adults?
If the lower performance of the
elderly results from both their abil-
ity level and their lowered moti-
vation, a shorter test may provide
more valid measurement. Also,
higher estimated abilities may
result as well, which could change
current wisdom about age-related
declines in ability.
Item generation by cogni-
tive design principles. In the first
century of testing, it was almost
axiomatic that test items must
exist prior to test administration.
Items were entered into either a
test form or an item bank for use
in adaptive testing. In the second
century of testing, I predict that
tests will no longer consist of existing items. Items will be
written during the course of testing. That is, optimally
informative items for measuring the examinee will be writ-
ten instantaneously as needed by computer programs that
are based on a deep theoretical understanding of item-
solving processes.
At the turn of the century, research on cognitive
component analysis of ability was extended to item gen-
eration (Embretson, 1998, 1999; Embretson & Gorin,
2001). A cognitive design system is based on cognitive
mathematical models that predict item psychometric
Figure 1 - Comparison of Measurement Error Between Four














to be embedded in items for sev-
eral reasons. First, items can be
written for targeted difficulty
levels, since the source of item
difficulty is explicated by the cog-
nitive model. Second, with a suf-
ficiently powerful cognitive
model, test items can be used
without a tryout. The empirical
properties of items are predicted
by the cognitive model. Third,
construct validity is obtained at
the item level. The specific cog-
nitive sources of item difficulty
are known for each item. Fourth,
full item generation by computer
is feasible. Unlike the item-mod-
eling approach to item generation
described above, item structures
need not be based on existing
items, thus allowing new combi-
nations of features. Fifth, large
numbers of items can be gener-
ated quickly. Adaptive testing requires very large item
banks for optimal measurement. Unfortunately, human
item writers are unable to keep up with the demand for
many tests. Sixth, greater test security may be possible,
since the items need not even exist. That is, the specific
item content is not needed prior to administration of the
item. Only the design factors need be known.
An example of cognitive modeling research that
leads to item generation is a series of studies on matrix
completion items, which are used to measure abstract rea-
soning or general intelligence (Embretson, 1998). For
properties and response times from their stimulus features.
The stimulus features are linked to processing, such that
each postulated process is represented by one or more
stimulus features that control difficulty. Once the stimu-
lus features are established in a mathematical model, the
stimulus features of items may be manipulated to increase
difficulty in the various cognitive processes. As item diffi-
culty increases, item solving requires increased levels of
the underlying cognitive ability.
A cognitive design system provides an effective




















18 Item Adaptive 
34 Item Fixed 
Figure 2 - Measurement Errors for Two Tests on an Aging
Population
21
these items, Carpenter, Just, and Shell’s theory of matrix
solving was generalized to provide a mathematical model
to predict item difficulty and response time (Carpenter,
Just, & Shell, 1990). See Table 3. The theory postulates
that the number and level of the rules in the matrix lead
to increased goal management difficulty, which in turn
requires larger working memory capacity.
Rule level, in contrast, also influences abstraction
level that is required. Figure 3 shows a matrix completion
item that has three rules and no abstraction.
The cognitive model for matrix completion items
contains five predictors, a number of rules, abstraction,
and three perceptual properties. Multiple correlations close
to .80 are typically obtained from this model (see
Embretson, 1998; 1999). For the item in Figure 3, pre-
diction of item difficulty, ∃’, is given by the following equa-
tion, where q
ij
 is the value of stimulus feature j in item i:
The model can be applied to any item that is pro-
duced. The model also can be used to produce items for
targeted difficulty levels, with specific cognitive sources
of difficulty. For example, an item with both working
memory load and rule abstraction can be created by
inserting stimuli into the matrix format, which leads to a
high number of rules with high rule levels. For another
example, developing an item with a large number of rules
but with low rule levels can create an item in which only
working memory load is important. The exact display of
an item depends on item structure, in which the stimulus
features are selected and displayed to fulfill the cognitive
model (see Embretson, 1998, 1999).
Greater use of essays, completions, and worked prob-
lems .  The first  century of testing received great
impetus from the development of item types that could
be scored by stencils or (eventually) by electronic answer
sheets. Large populations, such as recruits in World War
I, could be readily tested. In the first century of testing,
however, the objective item types that were available were
limited to primarily multiple choice format. Other for-
mats, such as essays, completions, and worked problems,
required human raters, which led to greater expense,
Abilities working memory capacity abstraction capacity
Processes goal management correspondence finding
Item features number of rules abstract correspondence
(rule level)










unreliability, and delay of test scores. However, I predict
that far greater use of essays, completions, and worked
problems for measuring ability will occur relatively early
in the second century of testing.
Some recent advances in automated scoring paves
the way for using open-ended item formats. An early
effort (Bejar, 1988) supported the potential of WordMap,
an off-the-shelf program, to analyze grammatical errors in
sentences, such as those that may occur in written tests.
This effort apparently did not lead to a testing applica-
tion, however. More recently, computer programs have
been developed for scoring essays (Burstein et al., 1998)
and graphical problem representations (Bennett, Morley,
Quardt, & Rock, 2000).
The e-ratersystem, an automated essay-scoring
program, mimics human rater’s scores. The program
models the raters’ scores by scoring essays on a large num-
ber of linguistic variables, such as syntactic structure,
vocabulary level, and word content. The raters’ scores are
regressed on the computer’s linguistic scores to estimate
optimal weights for prediction. Then, once the weights
are estimated, e-rater is ready to score the remaining
essays independently. The results on e-rater have been quite
promising; for example, the correlation of e-rater scores
with human raters has been found to be greater than the
correlation of the human raters with each other.
Some caveats about the Burstein et al. (1998)
approach, however, should be given. First, the human rat-
ers’ scores that e-rater predicts may not have optimal
validity. That is, the scores given by bleary-eyed raters
after reading hundreds of essays may not reflect essay qual-






Figure 3 - A Matrix Completion Item
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1998). Second, the e-rater approach is essentially
atheoretical. The nature of the variables that provide
optimal prediction of human raters is not a consideration
in the weighting.
Bennett and Bejar (1998) describe a more theo-
retically driven approach to automated scoring. They
envision an automated scoring approach that is primarily
theory-driven, in that the scoring is intricately related to
the construct definition, test design, and task design. In
their approach, the features to be scored are selected and
weighted according to a theoretical rationale. Unlike
e-rater, the scoring reflects closely the intended validity
of the test.
The developments in automated scoring of open-
ended responses are exciting. With a bit more research and
development, I predict that they will revolutionize the
range of measuring tasks.
Broad conceptualization of what constitutes a “test
item.” In the second century of testing, I predict that rather
unanticipated observations will have the role of measur-
ing tasks. A broad conceptualization of measurement is
given by Mislevy, Steinberg, and Almond (2001). In their
evidence-centered approach, Mislevy, Steinberg, Breyer,
Almond, and Johnson (1999) specify several models in
the design of an assessment, as shown in Figure 4.
These models include a student model, an evi-
dence model, and a task model. Most pertinent to the
current discussion is the evidence model. In the evidence
model, the salient features of a work product or other rel-










Figure 4 - The Evidence-centered Design for Assessment
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the observable variables. Obviously, the term “work
product” is quite a broad category in itself, and which
features are to be extracted even further broadens the
nature of measuring tasks. As summarized by Mislevy
et al. (1999), the task of the evidence model is drawing
inferences about what a student knows, can do, or has
accomplished from limited observations of what a student
says, does, or produces.
Although applications of the evidence-centered
approach have been only illustrative so far (see Mislevy et
al., 1999), the broad framework seems likely to be highly
appealing for applications in the second century. How-
ever, the system is not practical unless statistical methods
for combining flexible mixtures of evidence are available.
This leads to the next prediction.
Flexible mixtures of evidence for ability. For the sec-
ond century of testing, I predict that measurement of abil-
ity will involve flexible mixtures of evidence. Abilities may
be estimated from a mixture of task success and qualita-
tive aspects of performance. This prediction is not pos-
sible unless a method for model-based measurement is
sufficiently broad to include diverse types of evidence. IRT,
as currently postulated, is model-based measurement, but
it does not seem sufficiently broad enough to capture the
diverse sorts of evidence that may be presented. For
example, the evidence may consist of a combination
of essays, graphical drawings, solution paths in problems,
efficient use of multimedia resources, and the course
of instruction.
A sufficiently broad statistical framework is
under development (see Almond, Steinberg, & Mislevy,
in press; Mislevy et al., in press). Graphic modeling is a
general framework for model-based measurement in that
it subsumes IRT, latent class models, and factor analysis
models. Priors can be incorporated into the system, such
as prior knowledge about abilities, the item parameters,
and task influences. The posterior, or the outcome, is
the probable ability given the person’s task responses and
the priors.
ASPECTS OF ABILITY THAT ARE MEASURED
The changes I predict in the measurement
of aspects of ability are: 1) the types of interpretations of
ability scores, 2) the measurement of qualitative aspects of
individual differences (e.g., processing strategies and
knowledge structures), and 3) the measurement of modi-
fiability of performance over changing test conditions.
The types of interpretations of ability scores. Ability
interpretations in the first century of testing were prima-
rily normative. The examinee’s score had meaning only in
reference to the scores of other examinees. In contrast,
(item) domain-referenced interpretations could be achieve-
ment test scores if subject matter experts stratified item
content. Domain-referenced interpretations did not seem
applicable to the relatively novel content of ability test
items. However, the cognitive component research on abil-
ity from the last part of the 20th century gives rise to a
new possibility. That is, abilities may be interpreted with
reference to the processes, strategies, and knowledge struc-
tures that are involved in item solving.
Domain-referenced interpretations of ability
require both a psychometric and a cognitive foundation.
The psychometric foundation must be model-based mea-
surement that includes indices for cognitive processing of
items. In this case, common scale measurement would be
obtained not only for items and persons, but also for the
impact of cognitive processes on performance. Several IRT
models, such as the LLTM (Fischer, 1973) and the 2PL-
Constrained model (Embretson, 1999), have the required
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property. Another approach (Sheehan, 1997) involves
applying tree-based regression of cognitive properties on
IRT calibrations. The cognitive foundation must be a plau-
sible theory to link item psychometric properties to the
stimulus features that underlie processing difficulty. Indi-
vidual item types for measuring ability must be studied as
cognitive tasks in their own right. In the first century of
testing, the cognitive component studies of aptitude pro-
vide the beginnings of such plausible theories.
The enhanced domain-referenced interpretation of
ability should note what pro-
cessing the examinee can do eas-
ily and which processes are
beyond him. An enhanced per-
son characteristics curve, such as
shown on Figure 5, illustrates
domain-referenced interpreta-
tions. In a person characteristics
curve, the probability for solv-
ing items of various difficulties
is given for a person at a certain
ability level. The example shown
in Figure 5 is for matrix comple-
tion problems, as described
above. Also shown in Figure 5
are locations on the item diffi-
culty scale of Carpenter, Just,
and Shell’s major variables for
cognitive processing, abstrac-
tion, and number of rules (Car-
penter, Just, & Shell, 1990).
These locations were obtained
using a variant of tree-based
regression to locate item catego-
ries. Locations are shown for
abstract versus concrete relationships, as well as for the
varying numbers of rules within the type of relationship.
Given these locations, one can interpret the person’s abil-
ity level by the probability that items with certain fea-
tures can be solved. Figure 5 shows that the person has a
moderate probability (about .40) of solving items with
two rules when the relationships are not abstract. How-
ever, the person has a low probability (about .10) of solv-



























Figure 5 - An Enhanced Person Characteristics Curve for
Process-referenced Interpretations
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Given the increasing demand by the test-taking
public for more diagnostic testing, I predict that domain-
referenced interpretations of ability will become prevalent.
It should be noted, however, these interpretations are valid
only for those persons whose patterns of performance
fit the psychometric model. Although most persons
will fit reasonably well, some will not. This leads to the
next prediction.
Measurement of qualitative aspects of individual dif-
ferences. In the first century of ability testing, a single
aspect of ability was measured, namely, its level. However,
it was often acknowledged that examinees also differ quali-
tatively so that the meaning of their ability scores differs.
That is, examinees may differ in their patterns of process-
ing competencies, in the strategies that they apply to solve
items, in relevant background knowledge, in motivation,
and in physical ways, such as handicaps and disabilities.
These qualitative variants in item solving may render their
ability scores incomparable. In the first century of testing,
the main remedy was to determine whether or not these
qualitative differences had impact on overall test validity.
In the second century of testing, I predict that
these qualitative differences will be measured actively and
used to guide score interpretations or to define moderator
variables for the external correlates of test scores. Several
psychometric developments published in the last part of
the 20th century could provide the basis for measuring
qualitative individual differences.
Person-fit indices (e.g., Drasgow, Levine, &
McLaughlin, 1991) may be able to identify persons whose
performance does not correspond to normative expecta-
tion. Person-fit indices may be estimated for tests that fit
an IRT model reasonably well. Then a person-fit index
may be estimated as the likelihood of their item responses,
given the IRT model calibrations. A person’s test protocol
is unlikely if the normative order of item difficulty does
not hold. Such a person would solve some very hard items
but fail much easier items, for example. At the end of the
last century, such fit indices were applied to check the
validity of the person’s ability scores (see Daniel, 1999).
However, qualitative differences among exam-
inees may also be regarded as resulting from latent classes
that differ in their approaches to item solving. Rule space
analysis (Tatsuoka, 1985) and the mixed population Rasch
model (Rost, 1990) assign examinees to latent classes based
on their pattern of item responses.
In rule space analysis, the latent classes for item-
solving are plotted in a two dimensional space defined by
ability level and by a person-misfit index. Figure 6 shows
a characteristic rule space, where the points represent
examinees. Several latent states (classes) are also imposed
in the rule space. These latent states are located in the
plot from an ideal response pattern. For example, in an
arithmetic problem, suppose an examinee does not know
how to subtract when borrowing. To provide the ideal
response pattern, each item is evaluated for requiring the
rule: The item is scored pass if the rule is not required
and scored fail if the rule is required. In turn, an ability
and a misfit value are estimated for the ideal response pat-
tern to locate the latent state. Examinees, then, may be
classified into the latent state if their ability and misfit
index is close to the latent state location. Figure 6 shows
several latent states. An examinee’s membership in a
latent state could provide diagnostic information about
the meaning of their ability.
The mixed Rasch model (MIRA) (Rost, 1990; von
Davier, 1994) also can provide latent class membership
for examinees. More than one latent class exists when more
than one ordering of item difficulty is required to fit item
response data for a population. Unlike rule space
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analysis, however, the latent classes are identified empiri-
cally in a data set. Each latent class is defined by a differ-
ent ordering of item difficulty. In turn, item difficulty
order is influenced by variables such as knowledge, pro-
cessing strategy, processing component patterns, and other
qualitative differences between examinees. An application
of MIRA yields estimates of the number of latent classes,
the item difficulties within each latent class, the propor-
tion of the population within each class, and the individual
class membership probabilities.
Figure 6 - A Schematic for the Rule Space
To illustrate, MIRA
was applied to a large
sample that had completed 34
matrix completion items. The
Carpenter,  Just,  and Shell
(1990) theory included a hier-
archy of rules that provided the
basis for determining whether
or not abstraction was involved.
Although it is assumed that all
examinees apply the same type
of rules to solve items, this may
not be the case. Figure 7 shows
a matrix completion item that
can be solved by either the rela-
tively easy holistic rule of
figure addition/subtraction
(i.e., values in the first and sec-
ond column add up to produce
the third column) or the harder
analytic rule, the distribution-
of-two rule. In the latter, two
instances of each object occurs
in a balanced fashion in each
row and column. If an examinee does not know the holis-
tic rule, the much harder analytic rule must be applied.
MIRA was applied to the data, and two classes
were required to achieve fit. Figure 8 plots the item diffi-
culty orders for the two classes. The regression line is plot-
ted to show equal item difficulties in both classes. The
items that may be solved by either rule are shown by circles.
The figure shows that these items are much more difficult
in Class 2 than in Class 1, thus supporting the existence





























large; approximately 39% of the population was estimated
to belong to it. Persons in Class 2 also had lower levels of
estimated ability than Class 1.
This leads to an interesting interpretative dilemma:
Are abilities comparable between Class 1 and Class 2? In
particular, if Class 2 had known about the easy holistic
rule, would their scores be much higher? These questions
are obviously central to the validity of the test as a mea-
sure of the construct for Class 2. If class membership is
available with ability scores, we could use latent class as a
moderator for predictions from test scores. Thus, the quali-
tative information could directly improve test validity.
For the second century of testing, I predict that
qualitative differences in performance will be routinely
assessed and interpreted. The models presented above, and
perhaps new models, will be applied.
Measurement of performance modifiability over
changing test conditions. I predict that performance modi-
fiability, also known as dynamic testing, will increasingly
provide the means to measure ability. In dynamic assess-
ment, the responsiveness of the examinee’s performance
to cues, aids, instruction, or changing testing conditions
is measured. Many different designs for dynamic testing
are feasible; but a classic design includes a pretest, inter-
vention, and a posttest.
Dynamic testing has been intriguing for several
reasons. First, dynamic assessment is a seemingly more
direct measure of learning potential, since learning itself
may be included in the measurement design. Second,
dynamic assessment may increase construct validity over
static ability tests. That is, the instruction or cues pro-






Figure 7- A Matrix Completion Problem That Can Be Solved by Two
Difference Rules
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sophistication among examinees, thus making the posttest
a more valid measure. Or the scope of prediction may be
broadened by examining performance under varied con-
ditions. Third, dynamic assessment may be useful in
assessing concept mastery. That is, the task is presented
under varying conditions, and presumably only those
with the greatest mastery will succeed in the most chal-
lenging conditions.
As noted above, dynamic testing (e.g., Hamers,
Sijtsma, & Ruijssenaars, 1993) was a topic of recurring
interest in the last part of the 20th century. However, the
psychometric basis of many
tests was questionable, due to
the use of unstandardized clini-
cal procedures and the calcu-




assessment has several require-
ments. First, item and cue
selection must be not only
adaptive, but also objective.
That is, the next item or cue
must depend on the person’s
responses, but the selection
must be sufficiently objective
as to eliminate human judg-
ment. Second, item construc-
tion must be theory-based.
Item stimuli and cues must be
related to item solving pro-
cesses. Further, item difficulty
must be predicted from these
stimuli. Third, comparable
ability scores must be obtainable from different cues and
items. This requirement almost requires IRT scaling to be
effective and also, perhaps, partial credit scoring (e.g.,
Masters, 1982) to incorporate the impact of cues.
An example of an objective dynamic test is Guthke,
Beckmann, and Dobat’s (1993) Figure Series Test, a non-
verbal reasoning test. This test exhibits many ideal prop-
erties for a dynamic measure. The test items were con-
structed on the basis of a theory (from structural
information theory). The cues were administered
adaptively, depending on item success. That is, if an item
Figure 8 - A Scatterplot of Item Difficulties in Two Latent Classes




























Rsq = 0.4431 
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were failed, then cues about the relationships were given.
Ability estimates were adjusted for the number of cues
given using a partial credit model. Full credit was given if
the item could be solved with no cues and successively
less credit for each cue administered. The properties of
this test include computerizable item selection, partial
credit scoring, theory-based item construction, and hier-
archically ordered items and cues by the theory.
Objective dynamic assessment depends on further
developments in other areas, such as plausible cognitive
models for item solving and appropriate psychometric
models (see Embretson, 1991). However, the needed com-
ponents for objectivity are increasingly becoming avail-
able. I predict that dynamic assessment becomes a main-
stay in ability testing. In fact, dynamic assessment may be
the main mode of measurement, if instruction and testing
merge as envisioned by Bennett (1998).
SUMMARY
Although ability testing was relatively stable for
the last several decades, I predict that the pace will
increase sharply early in the second century of testing.
Major changes in test development procedures, measur-
ing tasks, and the abilities that are measured will occur at
an accelerating rate early in the second century of testing.
The many developments in progress at the turn of the cen-
tury will be fueled by technology to lead to major changes.
Much like the early decades of the last century, the early
decades of the second century of testing will be exciting.
Test development procedures will evolve rather
quickly in the technologically sophisticated society of the
second century of testing. Continuous test revision, auto-
mated validity studies, and item development by artificial
intelligence were predicted as major developments early
in the second century of testing. The research foundations
and technology required for these developments are in
progress now and will probably accelerate rapidly.
The nature of the measuring tasks also will change
quickly, with increasing Web-based delivery of tests
and the employment of sophisticated model-based
measurement methods. Tests will become shorter and more
reliable quite soon. But not too far away are more drastic
changes, such as item generation by cognitive design prin-
ciples, greater use of essays, completions and worked prob-
lems, broad conceptualization of what constitutes a “test
item,” and flexible mixtures of evidence for ability. Mea-
suring tasks will become increasingly flexible and may even
include everyday behaviors (i.e., work products) as part of
the measuring instrument.
Last, I predict that the aspects of ability that
are measured will shift. Ability interpretations will be
referenced to what the person can do, qualitative differ-
ences between examinees on the basis of their performance
will be routinely measured and interpreted (e.g., process-
ing strategies and knowledge structures), and performance
modifiability (e.g., dynamic testing) will become
a mainstay.
I envision these changes to occur rapidly and at
an accelerating rate reminiscent of the first few decades of
the 20th century. Most of the foundations for ability test-
ing for the first century of testing were in place by 1930.
And, like the first century of testing, the first few decades
of the second century are predicted to be exciting times!
But will the pace then slow down, after, say, 2030, as
it did in the first century of testing? History would pre-
dict this.
With so many anticipated changes, it is impor-
tant to revisit the essence of objective measurement. The
basic psychometric principles that were pioneered early in
31
the first century will still be applicable, if conceived in a
more general way. That is, objective measurement requires
replication of behavior over tasks and conditions, empirical
evidence on the psychometric properties of the tasks, and
ability scores that depend on empirical calibrations of the
measuring tasks. In the first quarter of the 20th century,
these principles were developed and applied for the first
successful intelligence tests. Diverse tasks were developed
for measuring ability, tasks were calibrated on alternative
basis (the Binet versus the point scale), and ability was
linked to mental age or to norms. Although the applica-
tion of the basis principles of objective measurement will
differ in the second century, to generalize to the more
flexible measuring tasks and aspects of abilities, the same
basic principles will remain fundamental to testing.
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